Political Economy, Moral Economy and the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 by Svihula, Judie
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 35 
Issue 1 March - Special Issue on History of 
Contemporary Social Policy 
Article 8 
2008 
Political Economy, Moral Economy and the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 
Judie Svihula 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
 Part of the Health Policy Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Social Work Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Svihula, Judie (2008) "Political Economy, Moral Economy and the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003," 
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 35 : Iss. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol35/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Social Work at ScholarWorks at WMU. For more 
information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu. 
Political Economy, Moral Economy
and the Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003
JUDIE SVIHULA
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Institute on Aging
Through the lens of political and moral economy, I examined
the dominant values and actors in the legislative process of the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. In my content analysis of
federal hearings, I found that witnesses from government agen-
cies, Congress and think tanks had almost equal presence at the
hearings. Witnesses who were invited by Congress to testify at
the hearings expressed twice as much support for private inter-
ests than for the general Medicare population or low-income ben-
eficiaries. Few expressed concern for the uninsured population.
Witnesses offered almost four times as many expressions of sup-
port for market rationalism than social insurance and three times
as many than for improving Medicare's solvency/sustainability.
The 2008 presidential candidates are split between support for
social insurance and support for the private market. Medicare ad-
vocates will need to devote extraordinary efforts to significantly
counterweigh the strength and influence of market rationalists.
Keywords: Political economy, Moral economy, Medicare Mod-
ernization Act of 2003, Medicare, Privatization, Market rational-
ism, Social insurance
Who decides, in the federal legislative process, who wins
and who loses? Is it the public through their Congressional
representatives? Is it the state, through the president and his
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administration? Or, does policy reflect the economics and poli-
tics of market rationalism and the power of corporate capital
(Estes, 2001)? The political economy model elucidates how
social policy reflects the structural arrangements of society and
the distribution of resources within it. Political elections dis-
guise the reality that private property and capital determine
the availability of public expenditures. Estes notes that the
state is funded through and dependent on the resources gen-
erated by private profit and wealth, creating state interest in
facilitating the growth of private property. Thus the state pro-
vides business with incentives to maximize profits and imparts
limited resources to sustain the health and welfare of its citi-
zens. Health care services, transformed into commodities, are
viewed as economic products rather than social goods.
The moral economy model provides a conceptual lens to
examine the composition of normative practices and recip-
rocal arrangements contextualized within shared beliefs and
values about what is socially just (Hendricks, 2005). Market
rationalists believe the market is the best social mechanism for
exchanging goods and services, assuming that competition
and profit-seeking will create fair exchange for consumers and
higher rates of return for capital (Johnson, 2000). As part of
their repertoire, market rationalists promote privatization, a
transfer of public services provided at various levels of gov-
ernments to the private sector ("Privatization," 2007). Market
rationalism, which reinforces the ideals of "individualism, self-
reliance, independence, and gainful productivity as a measure
of worth" (Hendricks, 2005, p. 515), is privileged in today's
political economy. In policies informed by productivity and
economic priorities, the health and well-being of individuals
and groups are cast as commodities as hegemonic interests
exert their influence on the moral codes accepted by society.
This study examines the actors and values that influenced the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) and analyzes the
results within the context of public opinion on the legislation.
After a brief review of Medicare's history in section one, in-
cluding the actors involved and amendments to the program,
section two outlines the study methodology. In section three,
the research results are detailed, noting the predominance
of support for market rationalism and private interests over
concern for Medicare and its beneficiaries. Section four
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summarizes the views of providers and beneficiaries as report-
ed in surveys and opinion polls. The paper concludes with a
discussion about the influence of the pharmaceutical industry
on the MMA legislation, the 2008 presidential candidates' plat-
forms on health care, and a final note on the political status of
Medicare.
Medicare's History
Until the passage of Medicare in 1965, the American
Medical Association (AMA) had successfully framed any form
of national health insurance as a "first step" toward socialism
(Oberlander, 2003; Quadagno, 2005; Smith, 2002). Because of re-
sistance from the conservative coalition that included southern
Democrats, the AMA, employer groups, insurance companies,
and some trade-unions, presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt
to John F. Kennedy were unable to garner the congressional
majority necessary to enact such legislation. Bipartisan contro-
versy split along ideological lines in favor of market rational-
ism until three events happened: 1) the Democratic president
in office had a definitive social vision (the Great Society) and
powerful influence over Congress, 2) the Democrats gained
control of Congress, and 3) trade union leaders defected from
the conservative coalition. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
the Medicare legislation into law on July 30 as part of the
Social Security amendments of 1965. The Medicare program
was modeled after private health insurance plans and, despite
their misgivings, medical providers profited from Medicare.
Hospitals were reimbursed at cost plus 2% and physicians
were compensated for whatever costs the market would bear.
Health care expenditures rose dramatically. The increasing fees
along with the lack of accountability and controls in Medicare's
reimbursement process prompted administrative concern over
the program's costs and its portion of the federal budget. Yet,
attempts by the federal government to contain health care costs
via freezing price increases, utilization review boards, and pro-
fessional standards review organizations were ineffectual.
Alternative payment systems were encouraged through the
Social Security Act (SSA) of 1972 and the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) Act of 1973. The 1972 SSA legisla-
tion made provisions for research and demonstration proj-
ects, waivers (dispensations from Medicare regulations) for
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experiments, and Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations.
The 1973 HMO legislation utilized the private sector approach
of payment capitation within HMOs to contain health care
costs. Capitation systems pay the provider a flat fee per en-
rollee over a specified time period, frequently per member
per month. Pro-market idealists favor capitation because it
encourages competition and cost-saving mechanisms among
providers.
The ideological debate on controlling health care costs
formed around pro-competition (e.g. capitation) and pro-
regulation (e.g. fee schedules) methods (Smith, 2002). In 1982,
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the 1982 Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). In addition to introduc-
ing new cost containment methods for hospitals and physicians,
TEFRA provided incentives for HMOs to enroll Medicare ben-
eficiaries. TEFRA was followed by the Prospective Payment
System of 1983, which based reimbursement on diagnosis-
related groups, and the Medicare Fee Schedule (part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989), which based re-
imbursement on resources used and work accomplished. Until
the 1990s, all major reforms except those pertaining to Medicare
HMOs followed fee scheduling and price regulation.
A major shift in program philosophy would have occurred
in 1986 with the Catastrophic Coverage Act (CCA), which
would have required beneficiaries to pay for additional ben-
efits through self financing (Oberlander, 2003). However, the
CCA was repealed the next year due to a public misunder-
standing of and ensuing opposition to the Medicare benefits
and supplemental insurance. The ideological shift from social
insurance to market rationalism did take place a decade later
when the Republicans gained control of Congress. After a
debate over Medicare's first principles, Congress created the
1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA). The BBA created Medicare
+ Choice, a new structure for private insurance plans within
Medicare that included HMOs and Medical Savings Accounts,
tax-privileged savings accounts that can be used to pay for
health care. When the private market failed to produce savings,
HMOs exited Medicare + Choice leaving beneficiaries scram-
bling to find replacement plans. Subsequent research showed
that over the three decades from 1970 through 2000, Medicare
was more successful than private insurance in controlling costs
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per enrollee (Boccuti & Moon, 2003). The Medicare capitation
system currently provides payments to private plans under
a diagnosis-based risk adjustment model (for more detail see
Pope et al., 2004).
Since 1995, Congress has continually increased payments
to Medicare + Choice (renamed Medicare Advantage in the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003). The siphoning off of
funds from traditional Medicare to Medicare + Choice plans
has had the effect of reducing the Medicare Trust Funds and
destabilizing the program's financing (Marmor & Mashaw,
2006). The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 was a big step
taken by market rationalists to erode Medicare's social insur-
ance structure. Social insurance entails government responsi-
bility for its citizens through spreading risk across a large pop-
ulation-rich and poor, healthy and sick-in order to reduce
financial risk to individuals. The MMA provides prescription
drug coverage to beneficiaries under Medicare (Medicare Part
D), either through stand-alone drug insurance plans for in-
dividuals wishing to remain in the traditional fee-for-service
program or through new private managed care networks (CQ
Weekly, 2003). The legislation was crafted in isolation from
Democratic opposition and passed in 2003 with support of
AARP, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), and insurance companies. In the name of improving
competition and incentives to remain in the market, subsidies
are being provided to private insurance companies and em-
ployers, and Medicare is prohibited from using its leverage
to negotiate lower drug costs. Additionally, wealthier benefi-
ciaries are being charged additional premiums for Medicare
Part B; Health Savings Accounts (formerly Medical Savings
Accounts) are being promoted through tax incentives to those
buying individual rather than group insurance; and an alert
procedure is established for the President to notify Congress to
take action when the percentage of Medicare reimbursement
from general funds reaches 45%. The alert is sure to recur, as
traditional Medicare loses more funding through payments to
private plans and incurs greater costs by being prohibited from
using its negotiating power to achieve lower drug prices.
The crafters of the MMA, hypothetically to maintain ben-
eficiaries' sensitivity to prescription drug costs, created a gap
(referred to as the "doughnut hole") in the Medicare Part D
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coverage. Through the doughnut hole, which begins once they
reach an initial limit of total drug expenses ($2,400 in 2007)
and ends when they reach a "catastrophic" threshold of drug
expenses for the year ($5,451 in 2007), beneficiaries receive no
prescription drug coverage. Medicare Part D beneficiaries must
continue to pay their monthly premiums through the cover-
age gap even though they are not receiving the drug benefit.
In 2007, the number of beneficiaries without meaningful cov-
erage through the gap is almost 7 million (Steinberg, 2006).
Individuals with plans that do provide meaningful coverage
through the gap will experience substantial increases in their
monthly premiums at a national median of about 87%.
Estes (2005) has noted that prior to 1997, private plans were
promoted to reduce costs; in 1997 the BBA promoted private
plans to provide choice; and from 2003 forward, private plans
have been promoted as the only way to update and expand
Medicare benefits, giving greater payments and flexibility for
private plans compared to traditional Medicare.
Methodology
Scholars contend that legislative hearing testimonies are
used as a key method to influence legislation and that such tes-
timonies are reflected in policy options, which can be concep-
tualized as "sets of value priorities and causal assumptions"
(Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Knoke, 2001; Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993, p. 16). Via a content analysis of federal hearings
on the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, this study identi-
fied: a) the actors who were invited by Congress to provide tes-
timonies; and b) the recurring values that the actors expressed
in their testimonies.
Sample
Testimonies are the unit of analysis in this study. The study
analyzed the distribution of testimonies available through
the Lexis-Nexis Congressional Information System electronic
hearing database. All testimonies available in the database
were collected using the following criteria: a) they occurred
between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003, the date
when the legislation was enacted; b) they were listed under the
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subject heading search term "Medicare Modernization Act";
and c) the hearing specifically addressed Medicare reform.
Witnesses were identified over the entire study period January
1, 1999 through December 13, 2003. The testimonies selected
for coding were presented to Congress in 2000 and 2001, the
years that contained the greatest frequency of testimonies. The
coded sample comprised half (n=90) of the total number of tes-
timonies (n=180).
Data Analysis
Atlas.ti, a content analysis software package, was used to
measure values by outright expression or times mentioned by
witnesses in their testimonies. The testimonies were examined
based on their thematic cohesion within two ideological cat-
egories, market rationalism and social insurance. The market
rationalism category comprised values that included: a) relief
from government regulations, b) control of national health
care by private interests, c) individual choice, control, and
self-responsibility/assumption of risk, d) generational equity,
and e) market solutions [e.g. competition, means testing and
reducing entitlement benefits], and f) the use of managed care,
pharmacy benefit managers and formularies to reduce costs.
The social insurance category comprised values such as such
as: a) support for traditional Medicare; b) citizen entitlement to
the earned benefit; c) benefit adequacy and accessibility; d) in-
tergenerational interdependence; e) shared responsibility/ risk
pooling, and f) government solutions [e.g. use of government
leverage, administration, regulation and oversight to reduce
costs].
Results
The study involved: a) identifying and classifying the wit-
nesses who testified in the years 1999 through 2003; b) identi-
fying and classifying the population sub-groups who received
the witnesses' expressed support; and c) coding the value
domains that were consistently expressed by witnesses in their
testimonies in the years 2000 and 2001. The witnesses were
categorized into four major affiliation groups: 1) government
agencies (n=38); 2) US Congress (n=38); 3) think tanks/inter-
est groups [hereinafter think tanks for brevity] (n=36); and 4)
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assorted private interests (n=50) [comprised of witnesses from
health insurance (n=15), healthcare providers (n=10), business
(n=10), pharmaceuticals (n=8), and pharmacy/pharmacists
(n=7)]. The remaining seven witnesses were from state govern-
ment (n=3) or did not indicate affiliation with any organization
(n=4).
As depicted in Figure 1, witnesses expressed support for
three major population groups in their 2000 and 2001 testimo-
nies: 1) private plans (n=64) [in general (n=31), orby type (n=33)
which included pharmaceuticals (n=10), healthcare providers
(n=9), pharmacies or pharmacists (n=7), and insurers (n=7)1;
2) the entire Medicare population (n=29); and 3) low-income
Medicare beneficiaries (n=29). Just under half (46%) of the wit-
nesses expressed support for market solutions; 27% expressed
support for regulatory relief/flexibility; a quarter (24%) ex-
pressed support for individual control/choice. Twenty-eight
percent supported government solutions and just over a third
(34%) expressed a desire to improve Medicare's solvency/sus-
tainability. Few supported complete private control over the
drug benefit.
Figure 1: Number of MMA witnesses (n=90) expressing support for
selected population sub-groups
Private Plans 31)
0All Nlecicai Bnefiaiires 291
O Low Income Medicare Beneficiaries (29)
_n Pharmaceuticals (1 0)
.Healthcare Providers (9)
-Uninsured Medicare Beneficiaries (9)
0- Pharmacies/Pharmacists (7)
0
Insurers (7)
Medicaid Beneficiaries (1)
Middle Income Medicare Beneficiaries (1)
Number of Witnesses (in parenthesis)
Of the witnesses at the 2000 and 2001 hearings, those as-
sociated with government agencies expressed the greatest
support for market solutions (65%); over half (53%) of whom
also expressed concern for Medicare's solvency/sustainability
Political and Moral Economy of the MMA 165
(see Figure 2). More than half (n=54%) of the witnesses from
think tanks expressed support for market solutions. Of the
congressional witnesses, close to half (45%) expressed concern
for program solvency/sustainability, a third (33%) supported
market solutions, and over a quarter (28%) expressed support
for individual control/choice, regulatory relief/flexibility or
government solutions. Six of the 10 witnesses associated with
health insurance expressed support for regulatory relief/flex-
ibility and half (50%) supported individual control/choice in
their health plans. Witnesses associated with health insurance
expressed no support for government solutions. Two-thirds
(66%) of the witnesses representing healthcare providers ex-
pressed support for market solutions, and half (50%) support-
ed private control and regulatory relief/flexibility. A majority
of academic witnesses expressed support for government solu-
tions (50%). All of the witnesses from pharmaceutical compa-
nies expressed support for market solutions, and most (80%)
supported regulatory relief/flexibility as well as individual
control/choice. Close to two-thirds (60%) of the witnesses who
were associated with pharmacies expressed support for gov-
ernment solutions. Witnesses from businesses expressed some
support for three values: 20% each for regulatory relief/flex-
ibility, market solutions, or government solutions.
Public Opinion
Public opinion on the MMA through 2004 has been mixed
(Shaw & Mysiewicz, 2004). Initially (1999-2001), most respon-
dents from multiple surveys expressed high support (between
70% and 74%) for a prescription drug benefit, even if it meant
additional premiums. Opinion was split on whether the
benefit should be provided by government or through indi-
viduals paying private plan premiums. After the MMA passed
(2003/2004), about one-half of respondents stated they felt the
MMA would help drug companies more than Medicare benefi-
ciaries. From one-half to two-thirds felt the program did not go
far enough and from one-quarter to one-third stated they felt
the MMA would help beneficiaries.
The Kaiser Family Foundation surveyed respondents'
perceived effects of the MMA on beneficiaries (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2007a; Kaiser Family Foundation & Harvard
166 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Figure 2: Number of MMA witnesses (n=85), by affiliation, who
expressed support for selected values; nonaffiliated (n=3) and state
government (n=2) excluded.
D Program Solvency/
Sustainability
[] Regulatory Relief/
Flexibility
[ Private Control
3 Market Solutions
* Individual Control/
Choice
D Government Solutions
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ries save money, especially individuals with low incomes. Yet
they also said the plan was too complicated and that it benefits
health plans and drug companies too much. Pharmacists said
the plan works well at getting beneficiaries access to prescrip-
tion drugs they need, however, almost a quarter said "most"
and about half said "some" of their clients had problems filling
prescriptions. As of November, 2006 most Medicare beneficia-
ries who signed up for the prescription plans were pleased.
Ninety percent of seniors favored allowing the government
to negotiate with drug companies for lower prices. Sixty-five
percent favored spending more federal money to get rid of the
existing coverage gap. Adults ages 18 and older agreed that
improving coverage for the uninsured and reducing health
care costs should top the health care agenda for Congress and
the President in 2007.
In summary, during the 1999 through 2003 MMA
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hearings, witnesses from government agencies, Congress and
think tanks had almost equal presence. Overall, witnesses ex-
pressed twice as much support for private interests than for the
general Medicare population or low-income beneficiaries. Few
expressed concern for the uninsured population. Witnesses
offered almost four times as many expressions of support for
market rationalism than for social insurance and three times
as many than they did for improving Medicare's solvency/
sustainability. Because of their greater frequency in providing
testimonies at the hearings, witnesses from Congress, govern-
ment agencies and think tanks provided most of the expres-
sions of support for market rationalism. Witnesses from health
insurance companies also expressed overwhelming support
for market rationalism and almost no support for social in-
surance and, although their number was small, witnesses
from pharmaceuticals gave eight times as many expressions
of support for market rationalism than for social insurance.
Across various polls and surveys, the public and their provid-
ers appeared mostly to be pleased with the MMA, although
they felt the prescription benefit provided too much to the
drug companies. Almost all seniors favored allowing the gov-
ernment to negotiate with drug companies for lower prices
and most favored spending more federal money to close the
existing coverage gap. Adults of all ages felt Congress and the
President should prioritize helping the uninsured gain cover-
age as well as lowering health care costs.
Discussion
Economic, social and historical events affected Medicare's
inception and subsequent reforms. Wars, demographics,
changes in private industry, and public misunderstanding of
the program affected the legislative processes. Yet, dominant
political and economic interests through the vehicles of gov-
ernment agencies and congressional majorities have had the
greatest influence. The ideological shifts of those involved in
Medicare's legislation impacted the policy options that were
proposed and implemented. Invited by Congress to testify at
hearings, private interests (including health insurance, health-
care providers, business, pharmaceuticals, and pharmacies)
were the largest group of witnesses at the MMA hearings. The
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next largest group, outside the federal government, was com-
prised of witnesses from think tanks. It is not surprising, then,
that the witnesses expressed the greatest support, by far, for
private interests and market rationalism. Future research might
clarify the existence and memberships of advocacy coalitions
in the Medicare policy domain. A cluster analysis of the total
number of witnesses identified in the MMA hearings (n=180),
based on the values they expressed in their testimonies, would
be helpful in determining members of the advocacy coalitions
for social insurance and market rationalism. Further, a media
analysis of the terminology framing the need for Medicare
reform (e.g. "crisis," "socialized medicine," individual choice
and control, personal responsibility, big government) could
signal ideological alignments.
A question arose from the study as to why the results indi-
cated that few witnesses from PhRMA testified before Congress
on the MMA, a topic of great importance to it. Research by
Michael Heaney (2006) provided an explanation. Heaney inter-
viewed 95 congressional members, including Republicans and
Democrats from the House and Senate as well as senior, junior,
committee and personal congressional staff (49 Republicans
and 46 Democrats; 62 House and 33 Senate; 45 senior staff
and 50 junior staff; 18 committee staff and 77 personal staff).
Heaney's respondents stated that PhRMA topped the list of the
most influential groups in Congress (followed by the AMA,
AARP, and the American Hospital Association). One of his
principal findings was that although influence over health-
care policy is widely dispersed among many groups, size and
money make a big difference. No other industry has spent
more money to sway public policy over the past seven years
than PhRMA (Ismail, 2005). In 2003, the year that the MMA
was passed, PhRMA spent $116 million lobbying government.
Moreover, 52% of the lobbyists were former federal officials.
PhRMA's efforts have resulted in favorable tax laws, price con-
tainment, and industry-friendly regulatory policy at the FDA.
Indeed, the U.S. government contributes more money to de-
veloping new drugs in the form of tax breaks and subsidies,
than any other government.
The cost of prescription drugs is rising rapidly for consum-
ers. Over the seven years 2000 through 2006, the manufacturers'
list prices of 153 widely used name brand drugs increased an
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average of almost 54% annually; a cost increase of $368.00 over
the seven-year period (Gross, Gross Purvis, & Schondelmeyer,
2007a). In 2006, the list prices increased an average of 6.2%,
almost twice the rate of inflation. On the other hand, manufac-
turer's list prices for 75 widely used generic drugs increased
a cumulative 28% from 2001 through 2003 compared to a cu-
mulative inflation rate of about 7% and decreased a cumula-
tive 4% during the years 2004 through 2006 compared to a
cumulative inflation rate of about 9% (Gross, Gross Purvis, &
Schondelmeyer, 2007b). Nevertheless, any trend in savings on
generic drugs is likely to be offset, either by out-of-pocket costs
paid through the Medicare Part D coverage gap, or by increas-
es in the premiums paid for meaningful coverage through the
gap.
Drug prices are pushed by utilization (influenced by direct
to consumer advertising), price (reflective of manufacturer
pricing of new drugs, changes in pricing for existing drugs,
and profit margins), and changes in types of drugs used
(newer more costly drugs and fewer FDA approvals than a
decade ago) [Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007b]. Proponents of
the MMA say costs will be offset by increased availability of
prescription drugs in general, increased use of generics, more
people covered under tiered co-pay plans, and a shift to over-
the-counter status. Alternately, opponents say that costs will
continue to increase because the MMA promotes a dynamic of
risk segmentation, not risk pooling (Marmor & Mashaw, 2006).
In the health insurance industry, plans compete on price and
coverage for healthy beneficiaries. The MMA legislation shifted
expenses from the private sector and Medicaid to Medicare,
increasing the cost of the program to the federal government
and thus taxpayers. As healthy individuals are siphoned off
into private plans, the pool of insured people remaining in the
traditional program increasingly will become more risky and
more costly. Funds paid for plans to participate in the private
market will be unavailable to support the traditional program.
As a result, traditional Medicare will look more costly and
financially unstable because individuals who are high risk
have been separated from those who are low risk.
Providing health insurance and slowing health care
costs are top issues in the 2008 presidential campaign (Davis
& Collins, 2007). Democratic candidates Clinton, Edwards
170 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
and Obama envision expanding health insurance coverage
by spreading risk over large groups, generating efficiencies
through employer-based plans, and building on the success of
public programs. In contrast, Republican candidates Romney
and Giuliani foresee tax incentives to persuade individuals
to purchase personal health insurance coverage, eliminating
state regulation of private insurance, and expanding cover-
age without increasing the federal budget. Romney proposes a
"federalist" approach that would encourage states to develop
their own market-based reforms. To improve the efficiency
and quality of the health system, the three Democratic candi-
dates foresee utilizing pay-for-performance strategies, solicit-
ing comparative effectiveness research, and promoting models
that improve the chronic disease management as well as ad-
dressing health disparities. Candidates on both sides anticipate
pursuing preventative health care, promoting transparency in
health information technology, and disseminating information
on plans and providers.
As long as market rationalists have the greatest influence
over Medicare legislation, there is little likelihood that main-
taining Medicare's social insurance structure and principles
will counterbalance politically impelled economic concerns.
Increasing health and prescription drug costs are reflected not
only in Medicare but in private plans as well. Medicare's rela-
tive success in controlling costs makes it apparent that rheto-
ric about the efficiency of the private market is ideologically
motivated. The values underlying the MMA, such as compe-
tition, individual choice and control, personal responsibility,
and incentives for private plans, primes the Medicare program
for massive reform in the form of privatization. Already the
Bush administration is proposing to means test the prescrip-
tion drug benefit through higher premiums and deductibles
on individuals with upper-incomes, which would hasten
the reduction of Medicare's traditional risk pool (Weisman,
2007). To be significant counterweights to market rational-
ists, supporters of traditional Medicare will need to be smart
organizers and savvy framers of social insurance ideals as well
as to continue building and strengthening their advocacy co-
alitions. In the media, all sides extol their concern for Medicare
beneficiaries, rarely mentioning their own financial and po-
litical self-interests (Espo, 2007). Democratic presidential
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candidates can facilitate the repeal or modification of the MMA
and encourage legislation toward universal health care by em-
bracing social insurance ideals and bringing them to the fore-
front in their 2008 debates.
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